I found very interesting Damasio's book and the theory of him is quite
coherent but I think it isn't well-grounded in evolutionary aspects.
Let's see at first the arguments of him which lead to his theory of
proto-self, core-conscious and so on:
>DAMASIO:
>[...] Life is carried out inside a boundary that defines a body. Life and
>life urge exist inside a boundary, the selectively permeable wall that
>separates the internal environment from the external environment. [...]
>[...] Life and life urge inside the boundary that circumscribes an
>organism precede the appearance of nervous systems, of brains. But when
>brains appear on the scene, they are still about life, and they do
>preserve and expand the ability to sense the internal state, to hold
>know-how in dispositions, and to use those dispositions to respond
> to changes in the environment that surrounds brains. Brains permit the
>life urge to be regulated ever so effectively and, at some point in
>evolution, knowingly. [...]
Olah:
I think Damasio emphasizes only the individual side of evolution. We
and all of the living creatures have not only urge to survive but urge
to make their races survive. In other words, beside the individual
selection the group selection also exists in nature especially in
higher-order species. So the organism has to be "socialized" in his
species'life. And this is true at every level of the evolution. Because
of this keeping homeostasis of the organism properly means not only
regulating the body in a convenient way but also creating biologically
efficient connections with the other members of the species, for
example at reproduction or at the cases of aggression-these factors
regulates the life of the species but they are also reflected in the
individual's homeostasis. So the brain has to keep both of the area of
life in order.
Let's go ahead.
>DAMASIO:
>[...] The language explanation of consciousness is improbable and we need
>to go behind the mask of language to find a more plausible
>alternative. Curiously, the very nature of language argues against it
>having a primary role in consciousness. Words and sentences denote
>entities, actions, events and relationships. Words and sentences
>translate concepts, and concepts consist of the nonlanguage idea of what
>things,actions, events and relations are. [...] The narrative of the
>state of the proto-self being changed by the interaction with an object
>must first occur in its nonlanguage form if it is ever to be translated
>by suitable words [...] Requiring consciousness to depend on the presence
>of language leaves no room for core consciousness as I have outlined
>here. Consciousness according to the language-dependency hypothesis,
>follows language mastery and thus cannot occur in organisms that lack
>that mastery. When Julian Jaynes presents his engaging thesis about the
>evolution of consciousness , he is referring to consciousness
>Postlanguage, not to core consciousness as I described it. When thinkers
>as diverse as Daniel Dennett, Humberto Maturana and Franscisco Varela
>speak about consciousness they usually refer to consciousness as a
>postlanguage phenomenon. They are speaking, as I see it, about the higher
>reaches of extended consciousness as it occurs now, at this stage in
>biological evolution. I have no problem with their proposals , but I wish
>to make clear that, in my proposal, extended consciousness rides on top
>of the foundational core consciousness which we and other species have
>long had and continue to have. [...]
Olah:
If we presume that creatures have urge to make their species survive,
then communication between the members of the species is as important
as keeping the homeostasis stable, moreover these two processes have
effect on each other. So if we speak about language as a communication
form regardless of the nature of its signifiers (posture, motion of
face or words and sentences), then it is not improbable that the
demands of communication evoked the forming of the core consciousness
or at least these two helped each other in forming during the
evolution. I think Damasio ignored the communicational aspect of
language when he created his theory.
Cheers, Szabolcs
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