I think I was little bit misunderstood. Perhaps because I used vague or
wrong concepts.
I don't see the contradiction between the selfishness of genes and the
mechanism of group selection. I use the word group selection for the
mechanism when a group of members of a species has adaptive advantage
compared to another group of this species because of a change in their
structure, physiological mechanisms or their relations to each
other(this relation of course chemical, biochemical- I use the word
communication in a boarder sense, that is including chemical,
physiological communication as well). This can be happen at early stage
of evolution as well (I used evolutional level in this meaning).
You said that "genes are in individuals (their vehicles), and they are
selfish being selected for the traits that make their vehicles survive
and reproduce". But if -under some ecological circumstances- the
reproduction of these selfish genes is safer in a group of vehicles
(for example a group of ants) than among many individual vehicle, then
there is an urge -of course from the part of the selfish genes - to
stay in this group, moreover through the traits of their vehicle to
listen to the signs of the other potential partner in this group. So
behind the cooperativity the competition of genes still exists.(Of
course this group is maintained by the reproductional demands and
usually consists of genetic kins- but we have to explain why kinship
survive.)
And what all this has to do with the theory of Damasio about
consciousness?
If I correctly understand the theory of Damasio, the core consciousness
has developed because it has adaptive advantages. But I think what is
the object with which the organism meets isn't indifferent for the
organism- it can be an agressor, a potential partner or an edible thing
in the environment and detection of the signs of these objects which
certainly causes changes in homeostasis is extent to evolutional
pressures. And as working with signs is especially important for the
organisms whose selfish genes have an urge to stay in a certain group
(the signs can have chemical nature as well), I think object-imaging
(because of the greater relevance of objects) in this kind of organism
is as important as making maps about the object-organism relation which
is the ground of the core consciousness at Damasio, if I correctly
understand it.(I wanted to express this greater relevance of social
objects by the concept: social aspect of homeostasis, but I think it's
a wrong concept.)
So my questions:
Can the development of core and extended consciousness be divided so
sharpely as Damasio did (even we consider neurological facts about it),
because I think they helped each other in forming out during the
evolution?
And is there any neurological disease in which the patient's core
consciousness is intact but he cannot send any signs of it or when
core consciousness is damaged but he sends signs toward the environment
causing changes in it?
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