Re: Fodor: The Mind Does Not Work That Way

From: Kovács Kristóf (kristof.k@chello.hu)
Date: Wed Apr 18 2001 - 22:19:35 BST


> Gervain:
> At least to me, it was quite clear from the start that Fodor did mean
> massive computationalism (because in his interpretation, Pinker and
> Plotkin also do), so the input analysis should also be computational.
> I do not want to go into this in more detail, but I am not sure your
> example with the receptor and the hormone was really analogous.

Kovacs:
OK, it was clear to me too, I just wanted to emphasize that what is not
clear is whether Fodor is writing about the mind itself, or just trying
to criticize Plotkin and Pinker. In the latter case, it is absolutaly
OK to take massive computationalism as a premise because P & P also
did. But in the former - which I think is much more precious
scientifically, and Fodor in the introduction also mentions that he
wanted to write his own book about the mind not just a critique of the
P & P enterprise (New Synthesis), because he has already done that in
the London Review of Books - so, in the former an empiricist solution
of the input problem should not be falsified a priori. Rather, if he
proves that massive computationalism can not solve the input problem,
he should have argued why an empiricist solution doesn't work either.

Kovacs:
I do not agree with Judit becaue in the case of abduction,
where Fodor also showed that computationalism doesn't work, he nevertheless
took the effort and wrote several pages why an empiricist (connectionist)
alternative doesn't work either - even if he "did mean massive
computionalism". The simple fact that he didn't do the same in the case of
the input problem (rather he neglected the empiricist view a priori) simply
suggested to me that he didn't have counterarguments at all.

Best,

Kristof

P.S: As a reminder, the original Q:

> > Kovacs: The problem with the argument is that it presupposes that the input
> > analysis can only be done by a computational mechanism. If we agree with
> > this, the problem is gigantic: we have fast encapsulated modules, but for
> > activating them, we need slow global abduction, that is, we have to search
> > all our mind (knowledge) to decide which one to activate.
> >
> > Still Kovacs: However, if we do not insist on a computational system for
> > doing this analysis, we are saved.
>
> At least to me, it was quite clear from the start that Fodor did mean
> massive computationalism (because in his interpretation, Pinker and
> Plotkin also do), so the input analysis should also be computational.
> I do not want to go into this in more detail, but I am not sure your
> example with the receptor and the hormone was really analogous.
>
> Judit
>



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