Mealey Comm colman

From: Chan Dorothy (dwyc195@psy.soton.ac.uk)
Date: Fri May 15 1998 - 15:11:30 BST


I am reading the commentary for Mealey's article and I don't quite get
the "game of Chicken" by Maynard Smith(which appears in Andre M.
Colman's comm.). The model talks about a mixed-strategy equlibrium
point which the population will evolve into. What is this point
got to do with the probability of choosing to cooperate or to
defect? Is this model different from the Prisoner's Dillema because
it takes into account the no. of people who chosse either to
cooperate or to defect tend to fluctuate? How does this model
determine what is the payoff for choosing to cooperate (or to
defect?)



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