On Wed, 12 Feb 97 14:31:19 GMT Harnad, Stevan wrote:
> So if seeing a red chair is an experience, a feeling, we could call that
> "EXTRAspection" because we are aware of something OUTside our bodies
> and our minds. "INTROspection" is what we do when we are aware of
> what is going on INside our minds, for example, when we imagine a pink
OK, I think I've understood so far that mind = awareness =
(extraspection + intraspection). Stevan, you then say:
> All feelings are actually taking place in our minds, of course,
> rather than out in the world. The hallucinated red chair is an
> example: What it feels like to see a red chair is the same when there
> really is a red chair you are looking at and when you just hallucinate
> the chair. It FEELS the same, and feelings are in the head. We
> understand this, and we understand the difference between seeing a real
> red chair and hallucinating one. The difference between the two cases
> is something we arrive at by introspection, by reflecting on what's
> going on in our mind.
> Unfortunately, introspection -- reflecting on what's going on in our
> mind -- does not explain how our minds work.
So I must now add feelings to the equation, ie., mind = feelings =
extraspection + intraspection. And, as you say, cogsci deals with
extraspection representations . How then, will cogsci recognise the
inputs and workings of intraspection in terms of the EFFECTS on the
Stevan, Presumably, cogsci says intraspection is hard coded in the
machine - the black box. But intraspection's logic may have a big
impact upon extraspection. Take, for example, the first few e-mail
notes from th PY104 group. Introspection may have produced a coherent
(to the writer) message (which now becomes a physical representation)
to be shared with the group; but was considered unintelligible or at
best unclear by some. Thus,intraspection expressed as extraspection
through language can either be sense or nonsense - depending not just
on the use of a common spoken language but also, I suggest, by a
congruent introspective experience/ association.
Do cogsci models cope with this sense - nonsense continuum(?) by
assuming in effect no intraspective intervention; or do they assume
that intraspective structures in each individual mind/brain
relationship are the same? In fact, back to my starting point: mind =
awareness = (extraspection+introspection).
If this statement is true, has anyone in cogsci any short-medium term
plans to begin to integrate introspective psychology as a fellow member
of the interdisciplinary team? Dunsdon, Graham.
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