On Tue, 16 May 2000, Shaw, Leo wrote:
> My understanding of Ziemke's argument was that, while some approaches
> can provide grounding of symbols, the problem still remains that the
> agent isn't doing things for its own reasons, but because it has been
> told to do so. For example, in the case of Regier's system, the system
> can recognise faces, but has no reason to do so. On the other hand, if
> it was recognising faces because one person 'switched it off', and the
> other 'fed it', it would have a reason.
These worries only arise with sub-total, sub-Turing toy fragments (like
disembodied "face-recognizers"). Reaching T3-scale takes care of all of
this, and you no longer have to worry about what's going on inside (any
more than we worry about one another).
> > Harnad:
> > The symbol problem is real enough (how do we connect symbols to their
> > meanings without the mediation of an external interpreter's mind?), but
> > where does the "degree" come in? A symbol system whose meaning are
> > autonomously connected to the things they are about is grounded, but
> > only nontrivial symbol systems are worth talking about. (An "on/off"
> > system, whose only two symbolic states are "I am on" and "I am off" is
> > grounded if it's on when it's on and off when it's off, but so what?)
> But surely the point is that the on / off action isn't grounded: an
> amoeba moves away from sharp objects, for which it has a good reason.
> It may be the simplest kind of behavior, but it could be a step in the
> right direction. An on / off switch has nothing.
The words (squiggles) "on" and "off" are ungrounded. But if the
squiggles (which could be anything) happen to be the setting of a light
switch, then "on" and "off" ARE "grounded," but only in a trivial sense
(like the "Life is Like a Bagel" joke). It is T3-scale that makes
Put it another way: a "grounded" on/off switch is a toy. A trivial robot
is a toy too. Their problem (unlike the problem of a nontrivial symbol
system), is not that they are ungrounded, but that they are subtotal,
> > Harnad:
> > But to meet this condition, to be grounded, all a system needs is
> > autonomy (and T3 power). With that, it's grounded, regardless of
> > whether it is integrated or modular, and regardless of whether (or how)
> > its transducers are "designed."
> > ...
> > The only requirement for groundedness is
> > that there should be no human mediator needed in the exercise of its T3
> > capacity. How it got that capacity is irrelevant.
> Perhaps Ziemke's argument could be interpreted as meaning that trying to
> allow a system to define its own behaviour is a SENSIBLE way to go about
> creating an artificial intelligence, not the only way.
I agree. But the test of whether it is sensible is whether it succeeds
in generating performance, where other attempts fail. Otherwise it is
merely a speculation.
> It seems to me
> that creating an agent that could pass T3 is a colossal task,
> especially if the only way of measuring success is to subject the final
> product to a Turing test.
True (although approximate way-stations will no doubt be milestones
along the way: ant and turtle and mammal "pseudo-T3"'s).
> Surely, human cognitive capacity evolved
> because it provided an advantage over competition. As time progressed,
> the capacity got greater. Maybe what we consider 'thought' is just an
> extension to this and the best way to produce a system with similar
> cognitive capacity to our own is to try to allow it to 'evolve' rather
> than attempting to define it artificially.
Again, speculations about how to pass T3 are welcome, but only
successful implementations can carry any real weight...
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